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Abstract 
Many existing alliance studies have investigated how embedded relations create superior value 
for organizations. The role of network structure in rent appropriation or pie splitting, however, 
has been underexplored. We propose that favorable locations in interorganizational networks 
provide firms with superior opportunities for appropriating more economic benefits from 
alliances than their partners do. Specifically, we argue that partners’ asymmetric network 
positions will lead to unequal brokerage positions that promote disparate levels of information 
gathering, monitoring, and bargaining power, which lead to differing capacities to appropriate 
value. This in turn results in variations in market performance. We also propose this brokerage 
position exacerbates existing inequalities such as commercial capital; thus, available firm 
resources will moderate such network effects. Evidence is presented in the form of market 
response to technology alliance announcements from a set of pharmaceutical firms. In general, 
we find that firms within central network positions and those spanning structural holes have 
higher returns than their partners. In addition, we show that this relationship is contingent upon 
available firm resources.  
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Introduction 
The resource-based view maintains that a firm is composed of a bundle of tangible and 
intangible resources, and that firms differ in their capabilities to exploit such resources to 
outpace competitors and generate superior economic returns (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Strategy scholars have shown that firms attempting to develop the resources needed to 
outmaneuver the competition in their respective industries will often engage in strategic alliances 
to acquire essential knowledge and resources, and develop capabilities that are difficult to 
accumulate internally. These alliances have been reported to earn participants many benefits, 
such as cost reductions through economies of scale (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Powell, 1990), 
access to markets and technology (Bronder and Pritzl, 1992; Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993), 
acceleration of new product development and reduction of time to market (Bronder and Pritzl, 
1992; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Hamel et al., 1989), and provision of learning opportunities and 
facilitation of interfirm knowledge transfer (Hamel et al., 1989; Hamel, 1991; Powell et al., 
1996; Lavie, 2006). Thus, the value creation aspects of alliances and positions within a network 
of alliances have been well documented (e.g., Sleuwaegen et al., 2003). However, prior research 
exploring value appropriation (the division of wealth generated by the alliance between the two 
partners, or pie splitting) by alliance partners has been limited, but has recently generated 
scholarly interest (Blyler and Coff, 2003; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Wang, 2003; 
Kalaignanam et al., 2007; Kumar, 2010a, 2010b; Lavie, 2007). As Dyer et al. (2008) suggested, 
while there is increasing evidence that alliances are an important source of value creation, we 
know less about the factors affecting how partners split the pie generated from their 
collaboration. It is this combination of value creation and appropriation that accounts for the 
contribution of the alliance portfolio to firm performance. In addition, as the few studies on rent 
appropriation from alliances have mostly focused on how dyadic factors affect asymmetric 
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market returns, scholarly exploration of how network and alliance portfolio variables affect value 
appropriation is essential (Lavie, 2007).  
We explore value appropriation in the realm of alliances through the lens of brokerage 
positions in alliance networks. Brokerage is the process of connecting actors (bridges) in systems 
of relations to facilitate access to valued resources (Granovettor, 1973). Being located between 
established parties presents entities with opportunities for enhanced access to, and ability to 
utilize, information, as well as increased bargaining power. This will inevitably lead to gains for 
the broker that will be context-dependent (Stovel and Shaw, 2012)—in the case of alliances, 
larger shares of the pie that will be rewarded by financial markets. Granovettor (1973) outlined 
why these bridging ties are beneficial, bringing to light the network features of brokerage. Since 
then, various network positions have been shown to increase firm capabilities (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1992; Padula, 2008), which we believe lead to a greater ability to appropriate rents 
from an alliance.  
Stovel and Shaw (2012) elaborate on these brokerage structures, introducing the concepts 
of “middlemen” and “catalysts” that closely mirror the network concepts of centrality and 
structural holes respectively. Extending the previous line of research on appropriation in 
alliances, our study investigates whether firms with these advantageous brokerage positions, 
such as networks higher in centrality (rich alliance connections with others), or those spanning 
structural holes (bridging separated sub-groups of firms), will acquire larger shares of the pie 
compared to their partners. We believe these superior network positions will allow them to better 
extract and utilize knowledge from the alliance for appropriation and monitoring purposes, and 
also provide the better connected partner with greater bargaining power (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 
2007; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Stovel and Shaw, 2012). Such unequal power distribution has 
enabled the stronger partner to exploit the weaker in various exchange relations (Dyer et al., 
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2008; Emerson, 1962). For instance, Frazier et al. (1989) found that manufacturers with power 
advantages over their dealers (such as being able to replace them easily with alternative sources) 
were more prone to use strategies to coerce their dealers into complying with actions favorable to 
the manufacturers. Particularly, in strategic alliance context, Bae and Gargiulo (2004) raised the 
concept of substitutability and suggested that if one partner depends more on another for 
resources, the dependent partner has decreased bargaining power. Accordingly, the dependent 
firm has decreased ability to reap as large a share of the pie as its stronger partner (Dyer et al., 
2008).  
Further exacerbating the performance disparity, unequal bargaining power may expose 
firms to opportunism-related risks: the risks that some firms will try to extract knowledge from 
the partnership at the other firm’s expense (Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Although strategic 
alliances are supposedly formed for cooperative purposes, scholars have proposed that 
competition to learn and concerns about value appropriation may lead to self-serving behavior 
and exploitation. Such exploitation may not be revealed until late in the game because 
organizations do not have effective means to monitor partners’ activities, a weakness that could 
considerably damage current business operations. A poignant quote from the vice president of a 
western computer company engaged in an alliance illustrates the hazards of this type of 
relationship: “A year and a half into the deal I understood what it was all about. Before that I was 
as naive as the next guy. It took me that long to see that [our partner] was preparing a platform to 
come into all our markets” (Hamel, 1991, 86).  
We argue that advantageous positions in alliance networks can provide firms benefits 
related to information monitoring, thereby giving them greater ability for early discovery of a 
partner's opportunistic behaviors such as those mentioned above, thus increasing a firm’s 
potential for reaping larger shares of the pie.  
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Examining the phenomena of knowledge creation, monitoring and bargaining power 
associated with alliance announcements between partners in the pharmaceutical industry, we test 
our propositions using stock market responses to announcements in the form of weighted 
abnormal returns. Industry characteristics may indeed account for some of the variance in 
bargaining power and appropriation (King and Slotegraaf, 2011); thus, our choice of a single 
industry avoids this confounding effect. We chose a set of highly controlled groups of firms 
within the pharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834), and we restricted our sample observation to those 
alliances formed for dedicated technology and new product development purposes. In general, 
we found that partners’ asymmetry in alliance network properties significantly affects their 
difference in market gains, and this relationship was moderated by existing firm resources.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
In their early work on dynamic R&D competition, Grossman and Shapiro (1987) showed both 
positive and negative dynamics in technology joint ventures: while technology cooperation 
increases the joint expected profit by saving costs and sharing new knowledge breakthroughs, 
firms also attempt to reap the greatest share of the outcomes by engaging in intensively 
competitive races to gain and independently utilize the knowledge created. This partnership 
hazard results in a trade-off between the common interests in efforts spent on producing a greater 
joint outcome, and conflicting interests in efforts spent on securing a greater individual part of 
the pie (Larsson et al., 1998). Zeng and Chen (2003) suggested that alliance partners face social 
dilemmas in managing the inherent tension between cooperation and competition among 
themselves. Firms may internalize each other’s skills and exploit their partners by applying them 
to areas outside the alliances (Hamel, 1991; Zeng and Chen, 2003), areas that could possibly be 
in head-to-head competition with the partner.  
   
 - 6 - 
 
As most firms are embedded in broad networks of relationships, it is particularly 
important to examine how firms’ networks of social relations will allow them to reduce the risk 
of being exploited by their partners and thus realize greater returns from the alliance. In fact, 
scholars have deemed the segmentation of individual alliances or transactions as an inappropriate 
unit of analysis. For example, Kogut (1988) noted the limitation of focusing on individual 
transactions and emphasized that individual alliances may be affected by the historical 
involvement between the partners. Khanna (1998) also suggested broadening the relevant 
analytical scope, by highlighting that “individual alliances are influenced by concurrent activities 
not governed by the alliance.” Analysis of the network of alliances is crucial in determining 
whether a business is in a position to reap superior economic rents, as the overall network in 
which they are embedded influences firms’ activities (Dyer et al., 2008). For example, a specific 
partner may contribute valuable resources to the focal firm, but this may not necessarily lead to 
increased dependency as long as the focal firm can seek similar resources from other partners. 
The notion of resource dependency and partner substitutability emphasized that we need to look 
at a firm’s portfolio of alliances and its overall connections with others to analyze whether the 
resource a single partner brings is scarce or substitutable, thus increasing bargaining power (Bae 
and Gargiulo, 2004). More recently, Lavie (2007) proposed an alliance portfolio framework, and 
also suggested that firms’ relative bargaining power depends on relative availability of 
alternative alliances to partners in its alliance portfolio. In Lavie’s (2007) study, he mainly 
focused on how relational characteristics of ties and partner attributes affect value appropriation 
between partners in the form of differing market returns. Our current research extends his earlier 
framework by exploring the structural properties of the alliance network and the positional 
difference between partners in the network.  
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Several scholars have addressed the issue of pie sharing from the game theoretic 
approach, in which the participants typically know ex-ante the nature and size of the pie, and 
how to assess the processes and resources that create it (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). 
Nevertheless, as Jap (2001) suggested, speculation of all the expected outcomes or the magnitude 
of these outcomes ex-ante may be difficult, and tying each organization’s tasks and resources to 
its outcome is also arduous, as these collaborations often involve significant intangible resources. 
Especially in the case of lack of formal monitoring mechanisms, firms are at greater 
disadvantage when they cannot observe partners’ behavior, and more importantly cannot predict 
the impact of partners’ actions. Khanna et al. (1998) suggested that firms might pursue private 
benefits unilaterally by picking up skills from their partners and applying these skills in areas 
unrelated to specified alliance activities. For example, strategic alliances may suffer from 
unfavorable knowledge leakage such as uncontrolled information disclosure and asymmetric 
diffusion of core competencies to partner firms (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). This concern may 
be aggravated or somewhat alleviated in the context of alliance networks. Granovetter’s (1973) 
theory introduces the notion that bridges between cohesive clusters are important channels of 
information flow. As firms exchange information and ideas with a web of partners, they can have 
additional information sources, such as through third parties, about what activities their partners 
are undertaking. Network structure also affects the information benefits a firm can obtain, and 
thus influences the ease of monitoring and deterrence for certain firms.  
 
Network Centrality Effect. As different structural locations in interorganizational networks may 
affect a firm’s ability to benefit from a relationship (Walter et al., 1996), we suggest that firms 
more centrally located in a network will have a higher likelihood of appropriating larger shares 
of pie than their partners. This is because this “middleman” brokerage position (an entity in the 
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middle of otherwise unconnected actors) will lead to performance benefits due to the advantages 
discussed below (Stovel and Shaw, 2012). Madhavan et al. (1998) suggested that centrally 
located firms are exposed to richer external resources and have higher control and flexibility of 
resource allocation to achieve their organizational goals. Because these central firms have a wide 
range of partners from which to acquire knowledge and access resources (Koka and Prescott, 
2002), they depend less on specific partners for strategic assets. Such flexibility and partner 
substitutability will increase bargaining power (the ability to obtain accommodations from 
partners), and inﬂuence the outcomes of negotiations (Yan and Gray, 1994). This is amplified 
when its partner does not have symmetric access to resources (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Pollock 
et al., 2004). Lavie (2007) confirmed this notion by demonstrating that when a firm enjoys better 
access to alternative alliances, it has more options to pursue similar objectives with a multitude 
of firms, a situation that greatly improves a firm’s bargaining power (Lavie, 2007). Similarly, 
when its partners have limited alternative choices to acquire desired knowledge or resources, the 
vulnerability of these partners is very high if the focal firm withdraws from the existing alliance 
relationship. Thus, this centrally connected brokerage position will allow these firms to increase 
their share of relational rents—thus impacting the difference in market performance. 
Central locations can also help firms to better monitor partners’ behavior and thus deter 
them from taking opportunistic action. The level of monitoring in strategic alliances is quite 
minimal compared with formal level of internal governance. In the absence of these formal 
hierarchical monitoring systems, social network scholars have long suggested that social ties can 
provide informal monitoring and coordination mechanisms (Gulati, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). In a 
network system, members can collect information about potential partners’ behavior through 
embedded ties. For example, Gulati (1999) found that firms actively seek and collect information 
about others through the existing network of partner connections. Specifically, he reported from 
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an interview with an alliance manager: “Our network of partners is an active source of 
information for us about new deals. We are in constant dialogue with many of our partners, and 
this allows us to find many new opportunities with them and also with other firms out there” 
(Gulati, 1999, 401).  
This evidence suggests that firms will impose sanctions on partners that have behaved 
negatively in previous alliances, by reporting the behavior to firms the opportunistic partner may 
want to form relationships with in the future. Compared with firms that are central in networks 
with rich information channels, peripheral organizations with few connections in the network are 
more likely to experience delayed or missed information related to their partners’ behaviors. The 
effect of such network monitoring could be twofold: firms with transparent information exposure 
are deterred from opportunistic behavior, and organizations with few external monitoring 
constraints have better opportunities to take unobserved actions for their benefit.  
According to Ernst and Halevy (2000), although the stock market responds sharply to 
announcements of alliances in general, it favors some types of transactions that will increase a 
firm’s central connectiveness. This study demonstrated that many of the most successful 
businesses use alliances to position themselves in the center of a network where they can flexibly 
leverage intangible capital and enrich their information channels. This indicates that even though 
alliances are dyadic, relative bilateral dependency and bargaining power are also affected by 
each firm’s connections to others in the overall network. Thus, all else being equal, firms high in 
centrality engage in alliances with firms lower in centrality be rewarded with higher market 
returns.  
 
H1: A firm with higher network centrality relative to its partner in an alliance 
network will have higher weighted returns than its partner does. 
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Structural Hole Effect. Bridging or boundary-spanning ties can connect a focal firm to resources 
and opportunities not available to other network contacts (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Burt’s 
(1992) definition of a structural hole—when one party is connected to two other parties that are 
themselves not connected, and thus do not share resources—implies that firms spanning 
structural holes will enjoy both resource and information advantages over their partners. Knoke 
(1994) suggested that organizational activities can be viewed as “the process by which social 
actors create and mobilize their network connections within and between organizations to gain 
access to other social actors’ resources.” On some occasions these bridging ties are critical when 
they can control the resource and information flows. In addition to gaining access to information 
not available to firms that do not span boundaries, this unique “catalyst” role (the one who 
controls the flow of information between two entities) will increase its partner’s dependency and 
improve its own bargaining power (Stovel and Shaw, 2012). This will pose a strong deterrence 
and greatly discourage partners’ opportunistic behavior, decreasing the risk that the partner will 
exploit valuable assets. If a firm that bridges disconnected groups withdraws from an alliance, its 
partner may be considerably more vulnerable, in that removing such a bridge will render partner 
firms unable to gain access to information and resources from those connected by this bridge. 
Thus, powerful partners can extract greater benefits by threatening to withdraw from the 
collaboration, and instead operate the business alone or with another partner (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Ultimately, spanning structural holes will lead to unique advantages for the firm 
that make it difficult for its partners to find alternative sources and switch to other alliance 
targets.  
In addition to and separate from bargaining power benefits, Burt (1997) claimed that the 
structural hole is an opportunity for the connecting party to benefit from non-redundant 
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information provided by both parties, giving it better opportunities to find complementary assets 
to amplify the value of the alliance. People whose social ties are limited to one clique, or group, 
are less likely to receive diverse information, because information that circulates within a clique 
of highly connected workers is likely to be redundant (Brass, 1984). As a result, firms that bridge 
groups have better channels by which to gather and monitor partners’ behavior. Also, according 
to Zaheer and Bell (2005), when knowledge is developed through firm interaction, organizations 
that bridge structural holes will be able to develop new understandings regarding emergent 
threats and opportunities—advantages denied to those who do not bridge holes. Within the 
pharmaceutical industry, for example, if Pfizer has alliances to explore genetically engineered 
DNA with both Alkermes and Amgen (who do not have alliances with each other), and both 
alliances produce compounds that could potentially be combined into an oncology therapy, 
Pfizer will garner a substantial amount of the value created by both alliances based on its 
brokerage position. 
As we have argued, the unique combination of alliances provided by a network rich in 
structural holes affords firms the information control that will garner greater shares of the overall 
pie. America Online (AOL), which had a market value of over $100 billion after fewer than 
fifteen years in business, provides additional evidence of this. Earnst and Halevy (2001) attribute 
this astounding record of success, in large part, to AOL’s web of alliances from various 
separated industry sections, which helped it become the world’s largest provider of online 
services. Such success is more related to the scope of partnerships maintained by AOL across 
many sectors, rather than the scale of alliance investment or number of partners within a single 
sector. Through a portfolio of diversified and separated partners, AOL gained access to 
information regarding potential products, content and technology—information that allowed it to 
develop unique assets that would not have been available from any single firm. AOL’s success in 
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such alliance management can partially be explained by its unique position to bridge the links 
across several disconnected groups. Its partners had limited connections within small cliques, 
and most of the time claimed only a small share of the revenue division because of their weak 
positions. AOL was rewarded handsomely for this brokerage position, in terms of enhanced 
market value. 
 
H2: A firm bridging more structural holes relative to its partner in the alliance 
network will have higher weighted returns than its partner does. 
 
The Moderating Role of Commercial Capital 
Khanna et al. (1998) also suggested that firm characteristics can be seen as parameters that affect 
the particular realization of the partner’s perceived benefits. One important factor moderating the 
potential benefit one organization can receive is its commercial assets, or the resources a firm 
can utilize to commercialize its technologies and products (Madhavan et al., 1998; Park et al., 
2002). Ahuja (2000) suggested that commercial capital is a particularly important resource for 
transforming knowledge and technical innovations into products and services, which entails the 
development of manufacturing and marketing capabilities, and assets such as facilities and 
distribution networks. Thus, firms endowed with higher levels of commercial resources should 
find it easier to exploit rent-appropriating opportunities as these firms are have less economic 
constraints, and can quickly use the technology in their product-development processes. As a 
result, they can expedite the market introduction process and capture additional rents, greatly 
enhancing future revenue-producing capabilities.  
As Zhao (2006) suggested, specialized complimentary assets, such as the right 
manufacturing and marketing capabilities, are crucial to the successful commercialization of new 
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technologies. Firms can discourage involuntary leakage and exploitation of its own technology 
by its partner when commercialization of such technology requires significant capabilities and 
resources that are not readily available to its partner. Thus, while information and bargaining 
power asymmetries create unequal potential for partners to acquire different shares of the pie, 
lack of commercial resources will make it more difficult for firms to realize rent-generating 
opportunities under such circumstances. We believe that, because commercial capital is an 
important component of exploiting rent-appropriating opportunities, this will be reflected in their 
ability to take advantage of their network position to appropriate rents, and resultant market 
performance. This suggests: 
 
H3a: Organizational commercial capital will positively moderate the relationship 
between network centrality asymmetry and weighted returns. 
 
H3b: Organizational commercial capital will positively moderate the relationship 
between structural hole asymmetry and weighted returns. 
 
Methods 
Sample. Our focus is on firms listing pharmaceutical preparation as their primary business. 
According to Okamura and Vonortas (2006), in a study of five industries including 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, computers, electronics and instruments, pharmaceuticals had greater 
numbers of alliances than other industries; thus, we believe the pharmaceutical industry to be an 
appropriate industry in which to study the benefits of networks. We used SIC code 2834 (this 
designation was taken from COMPUSTAT, as well as the Compact Disclosure and Global 
Worldscope databases). Four criteria were used to identify a sample of firms from this industry. 
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First, firms that designated the SIC code 2834 (pharmaceutical preparation industry) as their 
primary business were selected from the COMPUSTAT database. This set of firms focused on 
pharmaceutical product development as their major business. We excluded those firms involved 
only in marketing and distribution activities in the pharmaceutical section. Second, to create a 
balanced panel of data, we selected only those firms that reported their research and development 
investments every year from 1994 to 1999, the height of the biotech boom. At this time, 
pharmaceutical companies were acquiring biotech companies and then forming alliances 
amongst themselves to share and better exploit the acquired technologies. Thus, this period 
provided a rich sample of technology alliance announcements. Technology alliance data were 
gathered from Recombinant Capital, a comprehensive database on pharmaceutical firm alliances 
widely used by past researchers (Lerner, 1994). To best capture the technology distance between 
alliance partners, we also limited our sample to those firms that have active patenting activity in 
each year of our observation window. Third, we focused on the alliances that were publicly 
announced and carry salient market signals to general investors. Firms may be engaged in 
various technology collaborations, but cooperative activities that are not publicly announced are 
not readily known to investors. Fourth, to observe stock price movement by each pair of partners 
involved in alliance announcements, we selected only those alliances that included public firms 
with at least two-years’ history of stock operation at the beginning of our observation window. 
This left us with 68 established leading firms with ongoing R&D and patenting activities as our 
sample coverage. 
  
Dependent Variables 
Difference Between Partners’ Performance Outcomes. While the sum of the abnormal returns to 
the two organizations would reflect the value created, we believe the weighted abnormal returns 
Commented [MH1]: Should this be "by"? 
Commented [anon2]: Yes, that sounds better 
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accrued to each partner reflects value appropriation. We used the event study method to measure 
the abnormal returns of both firms involved in the alliance announcement (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). Empirical studies from various disciplines have shown that event study and 
abnormal returns are appropriate means to investigate market valuation of alliance 
announcements. For example, Chan et al. (1997) examined stock market reaction to 345 alliance 
announcements involving firms traded on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq from 1983 to 1992, and 
reported that the average abnormal return (the risk adjusted return in excess of the S&P 500) on 
the date of the announcement was statistically significant. Kale et al. (2002) reported that firms 
with dedicated alliance functions (functions that strategically coordinate alliance activity with the 
goal of capturing and disseminating alliance-related knowledge) achieved an average abnormal 
return of 1.35%, whereas those without this function had a much lower return of 0.18% on 
average. Das et al. (1998) studied 119 alliance announcements across a dozen industries between 
1987 and 1991 and found overall positive abnormal returns when alliances were announced on 
the same day. Though findings from these studies were largely related to value creation rather 
than value appropriation or pie-splitting effect, they provided strong evidence that alliance 
announcements are related to variations in stock gains.  
The normal approach in event studies is based on estimating a market model for each 
firm and then calculating abnormal returns.  
itmtRiiitR εβα +∗+=
 
[R it  = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t, R mt  = the rate of 
return on a market portfolio of stocks on day t, α i = the intercept term, β i  = the 
systematic risk of stock i, ε it  = the error term for stock i on day t.]  
   
 - 16 - 
 
The deviation of the actual return from the expectation (abnormal return, AR) is 
computed for firm i on the day t as  
)( mtiiitit RbaRAR +−=  
We noted alliance announcement date as t = 0; day -1 as one day prior to the event; and 
+1 as one day after the event. This three-day window captures the possible “leakage” prior to the 
publication of the technology announcement or slow reactions by some investors to the 
announcement; however, this relatively short window excludes confounding events. We then 
used daily stock return of each firm in the period 260 to 10 days before the event (from day -260 
to day -10) to estimate the parameters in the above models (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). We 
also ruled out those alliance announcements with confounding events such as M&A and 
releasing annual financial reports that happened within the event windows.  
We then follow Bradley et al.’s (1988) classic finance study in computing the 
performance benefit to each partner from the acquisition announcement. While they compare the 
gains from the announcements of tender offers, their approach is general and we believe a 
rigorous test of our outcome variable.  
Using the CARs, we estimated the gain to the focal and partner firm in each alliance as 
value-weighted portfolio of the ith target and the ith acquiring firm, where the weights used are 
W T i  and W A i  as follows: 
∆W F i = W F i · CARF i                           ∆W P i = W P i · CARP i   
 
where 
W F i = log of the market value of the focal firm on the two days prior to the 
announcement  
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CARF i = cumulative abnormal return to the focal firm over the three-day window 
W P i = log of the market value of the partner firm on the two days prior to the 
announcement  
CARP i  = cumulative abnormal return to the partner firm over the three-day 
window  
 
Independent Variables 
Network Centrality Asymmetry. We used Bonacich's power-based centrality in this study. 
Bonacich (1987) defined the power centrality measure based on the centralities of units that a 
unit is connected to. Essentially, the Bonacich power measure suggests that the power of an 
organization is affected by how powerful its partners are in the same social network. This 
definition is consistent with our earlier discussion regarding the embedded network resource a 
firm can access: the focal firm can gather the information not only through direct ties, but the 
information transmitted by those direct ties is again influenced by their connection to other 
members in the overall network. In addition, these network ties influence a firm’s collection of 
information about a partner's behavior. For each dyad, we calculate the difference between the 
partner’s Bonacich power centrality based on the standard UCINET formula. The Bonacich 
power centrality of network note i (denoted ci) is calculated as ci = SAij(a+bcj), where a and b 
are network parameters. In our study, those parameters are the weight induced by the centrality 
measures of partners a firm is connected to. According to the formal procedure, we chose the 
normalization parameter so that the sum of squares of the vertex centralities is the size of the 
network. We then computed the difference of Bonacich power centrality between each pair of 
partners.  
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Network Efficiency Asymmetry. We calculated structural hole measures based on Burt’s (1992) 
formula using UCINET routine (Borgatti et al., 1999). In this formula, P iq  is the proportion of i’s 
relations invested in contact q, M iq  is the marginal strength of the relationship between contact j 
and contact q, and C j  is the total number of contacts for firm i (Burt, 1992). 
∑
∑
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=
−
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j j
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1
1
1
 
After obtaining the structural hole measure for each pair of firms involved, we calculated the 
difference between the index of the focal firm and its alliance partner.  
 
The Moderating Role of Commercial Capital. Following Ahuja’s (2000) approach, we also used 
a firm’s annual assets to represent its commercial resources, and obtained data in each year from 
COMPUSTAT (Ahuja, 2000). We drew the sample from the leading firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry, so we were able to gather complete information related to assets. We also developed a 
similar alternative measure using the sum of the previous five years’ sales in the pharmaceutical 
industry, which generated similar findings. As firm assets and sale measure are highly correlated, 
we didn’t enter both in regression models at the same time, and reported our results based on 
firm assets.  
 
Control Variables 
Network Density. Coleman (1988) argued that a dense network promotes trust and cooperation 
among its members. We used the standard UCINET routine and calculated the density as the 
number of existing ties among the firms divided by the number of possible ties among them 
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(Borgatti et al., 1999). In dense networks, members tend to closely connect and interact with one 
another, thereby decreasing the uniqueness of any particular firm. In addition, due to the frequent 
exchange of information, the ease of monitoring other firms’ behavior is also affected; thus, we 
included network density as a control.  
We also included other control variables consistent with previous network studies, such 
as firm age, partner firm age, liquidity, and year dummy. Also, we controlled for alliance 
experience as the number of alliances entered into in the previous five years (Rothaermael and 
Leeds, 2004) and firm patent stock and partner patent stock, as the number of patents currently 
held by each. 
 
Analysis and Results 
We present variable descriptive statistics and correlations in Table 1. To observe the stock price 
movement of both partners at the point of alliance announcement, we had to eliminate those 
firms that were not listed or did not have enough history in the security exchange market. Our 
resulting sample firms are among the leading companies in the pharmaceutical industry as 
represented by their sales volume; during our observation window, all had over ten years of 
operating history. This sample includes 68 of the largest pharmaceutical firms (SIC 2834) that 
account for more than 80 percent of the products and sales in this industry.  
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
We report regression results on weighted returns in Table 2. Our results showed that most 
of the year dummy variables were not significant, so we excluded them from our table. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Commented [anon3]: Yes, thanks 
Commented [MH4]: Should there be an "and" after "firm patent 
stock"? 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Model 1 shows the results from our baseline model. In this model, we found that firms 
with rich alliance experience are more capable of deriving a large share of rents from the 
cooperative relationship, resulting in greater market gains from the announcement. This is 
consistent with previous studies that have shown firms can improve their alliance capacity 
through their past interactions with various alliance partners, and can better allocate and mobilize 
their resource to capture rent whenever the opportunity exists. Over time, firms accumulate 
experience and invest in activities that support dissemination of experience with alliances 
throughout the company. In most cases, the level of experience is related to the firm’s capability 
of successfully managing a portfolio of alliances (Kale and Singh, 1999). 
We test the main effect of centrality asymmetry in Model 2. The results provide weak 
support, as the coefficient of centrality asymmetry is only significant at α =0.1 level. This 
suggests that the centrality asymmetry and weighted returns have a loose connection, albeit not 
highly significant. In Model 3, we found a significant positive relationship between structural 
hole asymmetry weighted returns, as the coefficient is significant at α =0.05 level. This suggests 
that a firm that maintains more bridging links to separated groups relative to its partner has a 
better opportunity to appropriate value, thus generating greater returns. This also supports our 
earlier argument that a firm’s unique bridging role deters partners from engaging in opportunistic 
behavior, and thus decreases the risk that partners will exploit the firm’s valuable assets.  
We test the moderating effect of commercial capital, using firm assets as the proxy 
(Ahuja, 2000) in Model 4. We found that the interaction term between centrality asymmetry and 
commercial capital is positive and significant at α =0.05 level, providing support for H3a. In 
addition, the moderating effect of commercial capital on structural hole asymmetry in Model 5 is 
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weak and positive (α =0.10). These two findings suggest rich commercial capital endowments 
make it easier for firms to use rent appropriation opportunities, and investors recognize this.  
 
Discussion 
In his seminal work, Hamel (1991) pointed out that one negative aspect of collaborative 
processes is the reapportionment of skills between alliance partners because of the asymmetry of 
both learning and bargaining power. This creates a situation in which one partner can benefit 
more than the other in both knowledge creation and rent appropriation. Hamel claimed that 
asymmetries in learning can change relative bargaining power within the alliance, and successful 
learning on the part of one participant could lead to a pattern of unilateral rather than bilateral 
dependence. As a result, a partner that understands the link between interfirm learning, 
bargaining power, and competitiveness will tend to view the alliance as a race to learn and 
capture more rents at their partner’s expense (Hamel, 1991). While this study does not 
specifically address the learning process, the general findings extend Hamel’s arguments that the 
partners have asymmetric gains associated with alliance activity. 
This study follows the line of recent research on value appropriation in strategic alliances 
(e.g., Blyler and Coff, 2003; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Wang, 2003; Kumar, 2010a, 
2010b; Lavie, 2007). Specifically, we complement the alliance portfolio framework suggested by 
Lavie (2007), by incorporating significantly more social network contexts through our 
exploration of Stovel and Shaw’s (2012) middleman and catalyst brokerage positions. In 
addition, we not only investigated whether network structure influenced value appropriation 
between alliance partners, but also studied the contingent effect of firm resources.  
Several economic studies have examined value appropriation of alliances based on inter-
firm differences of size and technology status, though the findings are inconsistent. For example, 
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Chan et al. (1997) reported that, without investigating pair-wise partner comparisons, smaller 
firms experienced an average abnormal stock return of 2.22%, and larger firms achieved a weak 
and insignificant average return of 0.19% in stock value. However, when they ran pair-wise 
dyadic analysis on the firms involved in the same alliance announcement, they found no 
significant association between size asymmetry and abnormal stock returns. Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991) showed that firms entering marketing-related alliances did not generate 
significant returns, while firms with technology-related alliances experienced positive and 
significant market returns. However, Chan et al. (1997) found no significant differences in 
returns between alliances with technology development functions, and alliances for marketing 
and distribution purposes. Indeed, these existing studies that focus merely on size asymmetry and 
technology asymmetry reported mixed results, and suggest that these two factors only serve as 
incomplete explanations to value appropriation or pie splitting between alliance partners. Our 
study focused on the network connections of firms in a single industry where technology 
cooperation is very intensive. With size and technology factors controlled, our results indicate 
that advantageous network positions can also help firms increase their value appropriation and 
pie-splitting potential; thus, these should be taken into account.  
This paper contributes to existing related research in several ways. Theoretically, our 
study extends prior literature by examining value appropriation and pie splitting in strategic 
alliance studies. Building on social network theory, we develop an integrative framework to 
propose that a firm’s social ties and embedded resources can affect information asymmetry and 
bargaining power asymmetry, and thus impact the ability of a firm to appropriate a larger share 
of pie. Social ties can also provide additional monitoring and deterrence mechanisms otherwise 
unavailable in conventional economic agency settings, which help deter partners from 
opportunistic behaviors. In addition, they greatly affect the resource dependency between the 
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dyadic alliance relations, as each firm maintains a web of alliances and draws resources from 
respective alliance pools. Empirically, we show evidence that a firm’s stock gains relative to its 
partner are associated with its structural position in the alliance network, and confirm the 
contingent nature of network structure in rent appropriation, by demonstrating that commercial 
resources act as a moderating influence between network structure and the short-term stock 
performance. We believe that advancing the understanding of the variables and showing how 
they interact is a valuable addition to the networks literature, because of the profound effect on 
stock performance. These understandings will provide managers with more prescriptive 
guidelines for recognizing the actual structure of alliance formation that will appropriate the 
highest rents, as well as act as positive signals to general public.  
Our study has limitations. First, to observe stock price movements for partners involved 
in alliance announcements, we selected only those public firms with clear news releases on their 
specific ongoing alliance activities, rather than private or smaller firms. Investors pay close 
attention to alliance announcements made by leading public firms and are able to capture salient 
market signals that alliances send, so we expect the stock price adjustment to those leading 
companies to reasonably represent actual market responses. However, our findings on rent 
appropriation may not readily apply to alliances involving private companies. Second, we limited 
our sample to alliances related to R&D collaboration and new product/technology development, 
excluding alliances formed for marketing or distributing purposes. Alliances formed with 
intentions to enhance sales of established products may lead to more salient stock market 
response than do R&D alliances in the earlier stage of new technology development. Third, we 
relied on patent profiles to investigate dyadic technology distance between alliances partners, so 
we limited our observations to firms with valid patent records filed with the U.S. Patents and 
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Trademark Office. Thus, our findings may not generalize to startup firms that do not have public 
patent records.  
A possible extension of this work is to examine the risk-reduction aspects of alliance 
activity. Chatterjee et al. (1999) suggest, “The next step for developing a strategic model of risk 
premium is to provide more precise specifications of the included variables and more specific 
assertions about how those variables interact.” Because firms form alliances predominantly to 
decrease the risk of developing internally the desired knowledge or product, this next step is 
logical in the pursuit of this strategic model of risk premium. Ernst and Halevy (2000) suggested 
that alliances allow companies to develop future revenue-generating capabilities more quickly 
and with less risk than they would incur with internal development and acquisition. “In some 
circumstances, the market seems to reward alliances more richly than mergers and acquisitions.” 
Indeed, building new businesses means assembling a host of new capabilities such as products, 
technologies and customer relationships. Few organizations can develop these capabilities 
internally with sufficient speed, and alliances allow companies to leverage their existing skills 
while they quickly and flexibly access the capabilities of others. Thus, companies develop their 
networks and undertake additional alliance activity as a risk-reduction strategy. By examining 
investor-assigned stock risk we can ascertain investors’ evaluations of this strategy in reducing 
risk.  
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TABLE 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
    9 
 
10 
1 Weighted Return 0.23 0.12         
 
 
2 Centrality asymmetry 1.32 0.67 0.06         
 
 
3 
Structural hole 
asymmetry 0.03 0.32 0.08 0.04        
 
 
4 Own patent stock 161.80 192.34 0.15 -0.08 -0.12       
 
 
5 Liquidity 2.35 1.87 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.09     
 
 
6 Network density 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05    
 
 
7 Alliance experience 2.29 1.75 0.31 -0.15 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.08   
 
 
8 Firm age 14.35 5.12 0.15 -0.24 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.06  
 
 
9 Firm Assets 2031.24 1714.55  0.14 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.13 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11     
10 Partner patent stock  159.23 188.67 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06  
11 Partner firm age 13.27 4.96 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 0.08 -0.05 
 
(Correlations with absolute values larger than 0.25 are significant at p<0.001.) 
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TABLE 2: Regression Results on Weighted Market Gains 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
Centrality asymmetry  0.077*  0.075*   
Structural hole asymmetry   1.378**  1.693**  
Centrality asymmetry * Assets    0.0006**   
Struct. hole asymmetry * Assets     0.010*  
Own patent stock -0.005 -0.0001 -0.001 0.0004 0.0005  
Liquidity 0.012* 0.002* 0.002* 0.004* 0.002*  
Network density 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.006 -0.004  
Alliance experience 0.159* 0.116 0.159* 0.189* 0.177*  
Firm age 0.026 0.009 0.036* 0.010 0.007  
Firm Assets 0.003* 0.006* 0.004 0.003 0.001  
Partner patent stock  0.0092 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003  
Partner firm age -0.009 -0.011 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013  
Chi-square 429.01*** 455.21*** 478.26*** 462.54*** 452.58***  
(* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01) 
  
